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"BUSINESS (CRIME) AS USUAL" IN WARTIME CONDITIONS AMONG
OFFENDERS IN ISRAEL
YAEL HASSIN* AND MENACHEM AMIR**
INTRODUCTION
For nineteen days, from October 6 to 24, 1973,
Israel was engaged in the fifth defensive war since
her establishment. On the home front many immedi-
ate changes took place, such as mobilization of the
population, disruption of routines, and organiza-
tional activities (including those of social control
agencies). A spirit of patriotism and volunteerism
permeated the entire country, giving credence to the
assertion: "The whole country is a battle-ground."
Aims of Study
The main purpose of the present research was to
identify and differentiate several aspects of crime
patterns during the war and to compare them with
the same phenomena during an identical period
during two control years preceding the war. In other
words, the research sought to ascertain whether
members of the criminal population decided that,
despite the war, "business would be conducted as
usual," or whether these criminals halted, or altered,
their usual criminal activities.
The following hypotheses were formulated:
(1) The total amount of crime declined during
the war.
(2) There were qualitative changes in the pat-
tern of specific categories of crime during the
war
Decision and Methodology
Previous literature dealing with war and crime
presented the researchers with serious theoretical
and methodological problems. The available litera-
ture was found to be unsuitable for purposes of
comparison. Not only do we find that each war varies
in duration, scope and consequences, but the phe-
nomenon of crime (the dependent variable) also
shows no consistency. This lack of uniform criminal
behavior does not permit comparisons to be drawn to
the Israeli scene as to rates of crimes, types of
* Assistant in The Institute of Criminology, The Fac-
ulty of Law, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.
* *Senior Lecturer, The Institute of Criminology, The
Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.
offenders and offenses, source of data, or method of
computation.
Sources and Collection of Data
The data for this research was derived from the
daily reports on criminal offenses compiled by the
police, rather than from official crime statistics. The
latter have been considered unreliable by some
scholars, I in addition to being less complete than
police records.' Similar data covering a similar time
span was also gathered for two control years (1969
and 1971). In order to examine trends in the pat-
terns of crime immediately prior to the war the same
reports were also checked for the two weeks preceed-
ing the war (September 22 to October 5, 1973).
Tables (I-II) show the distribution of crimines (in
percentages) for each of the periods examined.
Four types of crime were analyzed:
(1) Crimes against the person;
(2) Crimes against property;
(3) Auto theft;




Hypothesis 1, which states that the total amount of
crime reported will decline during the war as
compared with the two control years, is supported.
There was a one-third decrease in the amount of
crime reported during the war. This decrease is also
'T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASLREMENT OF
DELINQUENCY (1964); Sutherland, War and Crime, in
AMERICAN SOCIETY IN WARTIME 185 (W. F. Ogburn ed.
1943).
2
M. WOLFGANG & B. COHEN, CRIME AND RACE 18
(1970).
'This report does not include data on road accidents
which rose well above the ordinary daily average. Nor, at
this stage of the study, is there any discussion of fraud or
other crimes of this sort including white collar crimes, nor is
there any presentation of Black Market activities or
profiteering, since complaints about such offenses in Israel
are reported to the Price Control Authority in the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry.
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reflected in the crime rates, i.e., the ratio of the
population increase by years to the number of crimes
reported for each year.'
However, calculation of temporal patterns reveals
that despite the already existing differences in the
amount of crime, after the 6th day of the war there
appears to be a marked increase in almost all
categories of crime. This increase from the existing
daily average appears to be largely due to the
increase in auto-thefts. (x2 = 11.0350; d.f. = 4; p <
.05). However, the increase is also notable for other
crimes. Several statistical tests were conducted to
check the hypothesis that there was no increase in the
number of offenses during the war period as com-
pared to the same categories in 1971. Again, the
result points to the fact that there was a significant
increase of offenses during the war period as com-
pared to the same period in 1971. In fact, compar-
ing the average for the first five days of the war to
that for the fourteen days before the war, there is a
difference of 56.1 crimes per day, whereas from
the fifth day of the war the difference is far smaller
remaining at an average of 29.6 crimes per day.
Although the increase is moderate, no such trend
is apparent in the control periods.
Hypothesis 2
Analysis of the aforementioned categories of crime
reveals the following:
Crimes Against the Person. An analysis of crimes
within this category shows that 43.1 per cent of all
such crimes during the war were cases of simple
'The rates for the population were estimated according
to data in CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACTS OF ISRAEL, Nos. 21, 23, 24 (Jerusalem, Israel).
5The tests used were: (a) the Bartolomeo Test which
was conducted on four groups of days (N 19) when the
number of offenses assume a Poisson distribution. The
Statistical Value was 11.039 and the Critical Value on the
level of 0.05 was about 9.411; (b) The Bartolomeo B. Test.
In this test the last three days in the period examined were
omitted since they pull the trend upward. The S.V. was
11.92 and the C.V. on the level of 0.05 was 9.065; (c)
Another Bartolomeo B. Test (with different divisions of
the 19 days). The S.V. was 10.133 and the C.V. on the
level of 0.05 was 9.574. In all of the above three tests the
Ho hypothesis is rejected, i.e., there is a significant in-
crease in the number of crimes during the war period as
compared to the same period in the comparative year of
1971; (d) The Mann-Whitny Test. The S.V. was 3.2347
and the C.R. of the distribution of a significant level of
per cent was 2.575. Again the results point to the fact that
there was a significant increase of offenses during the war
period, as compared to the same period in the comparative
year of 1971.
physical violence, with no use or threat of firearms.
This type of behavior also appeared most frequently
in the control years (1969-59.3 per cent; 1971-
59.5 per cent; 1973, before the war-57.6 per cent).
Offenses with the use of weapons comprised the
second most frequent category during the war, as
well as during all three control periods (1969-11.2
per cent; 1971-13.5 per cent; 1973, before the
war-14.1 per cent; 1973, war-time-17.2 per
cent). No consistent picture was seen in the other
sub-categories of this type of crime, such as the use
of firearms, kidnapping, etc., for the periods ex-
amined.
There are no reports of threats, assaults, or acts of
violence against the Arab minorities within the
borders of the State, although it may well be that if
such crimes did occur, they were not reported to the
police. The analysis thus shows that while there is a
decrease in the volume of crimes against the person,
no changes in the patterns of crime were found.
Crimes Against Property. There was an increase
in crimes against property from the sixth day of the
war. The majority of crimes against property were
burglaries: burglaries constituted 55.6 per cent of all
crimes in 1969 while other crimes against property
constituted only 7.7 per cent. In 1971, 55.8 per cent
of all crimes against property were burglaries and
10.2 per cent consisted of other crimes against
property. In 1973 during the prewar period, burglar-
ies comprised 53.8 per cent of all crimes, while other
crimes against property constituted 16.9 per cent.
Finally, during the war in 1973 burglaries were 42.1
per cent. Thus, there was a significant drop in the
total number of crimes against property during the
war, which may be explained by the sharp decrease
in burglaries.
Three different types of burglary were considered:
(1) home, (2) business offices and other institutions
and, (3) stores and building sites. Analysis of
inter-categorical differentiation shows a variance in
the pattern observed in 1971 and 1973 (before the
war) as compared with the war period. In the two
former periods, most of the burglaries were of private
homes (1971-50.8 per cent of all burglaries; in
1973 before the war-50.0 per cent of all burglaries),
while during the war only 37.1 per cent of all
burglaries were of homes.
Burglaries from institutions and business estab-
lishments took second place during the control years
(1971-45.1 per cent; 1973, before the war-35.8
per cent); while this type of burglary was the most
frequent during the war (48.9 per cent; X 2 =
[Vol. 66
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145.5868; d.. = 4; p < .001). The third subcate-
gory of burglaries (from stores and building sites)
remained in third place during all periods examined.
Burglaries during the war were mostly thefts of small
items (jewelry, transistor radios, groceries, ciga-
rettes, etc.), or small amounts of money. There were
almost no reports of thefts of building materials,
specifically cement, which had been extremely scarce
in Israel before the war and which had been the main
target of burglaries from stores and building sites
prior to the war in 1973. Informal police information
indicates that any thefts of building material during
the war were committed by Arabs, whose vehicles
were not taken by the army. Therefore, in the
category of crimes against property, there was a
decrease in the volume, as well as changes in the
pattern.
Auto Thefts. Police reports show that most of the
stolen vehicles were private passenger cars, which
were later recovered unharmed. While in all other
subcategories of crime there was a numerical de-
crease of about 30.0 to 50.0 per cent, auto theft is the
exception. In 1969 auto thefts constituted 23.9 per
cent of all crimes, in 1971-23.0 per cent, in 1973
(pre-war)-16.0 per cent. During the war, they rose
to 34.9 per cent of all crimes, a unique increase when
compared with other categories of crime. The in-
crease in volume and changes in patterns of this
offense will be discussed later.
Miscellaneous Offenses. The "'miscellaneous" cat-
egory was divided into offenses against morality,
victimless crimes, financial offenses, and crimes
against public order. Table I indicates that compari-
son with the control periods shows no significant
difference.
All Crimes
Table II displays the frequency pattern of these
offenses.
In sum, while the general pattern of all four
categories of crime remains the same throughout the
periods studied, it appears that there are changes in
the relation between the various crimes. During the
war there was a pronounced decrease in crimes
against property, while there was a marked increase
in auto thefts. Further comparison of the distribution
of crimes during the control periods shows meaning-
ful and significant differences; the greatest contribu-
tion to the difference comes from the changes in the
amount of auto theft. Examination of x2 (simultane-
ously) for the three years (including auto thefts)
presents us with: x 2 = 112.7884; d.f. = 6; p < .001.
Although the picture changes slightly when auto
thefts are isolated, even then the differences between
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MISCELLANEOUS CATEGORY BY SUBCATEGORY AND YEAR (Percentages)
Crimes
Year Victimless Financial Against Total
Morality Crimes Offences Public
Order
1969 17.5 24.5 1.6 56.4 100.0
1971 23.6 28.5 3.5 44.4 100.0
1973 (war) 17.5 25.3 5.8 51.3 100.0
x' = 11.3539; d.f. = 6 (N.S.)
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CRIMES FOR EACH OF THE YEARS EXAMINED BY CATEGORY (Percentages)
Crimes
Year Against Auto Against Total
Property Theft PersonPerson
1969 63.3 23.9 9.1 3.7 100.0
1971 66.0 23.0 8.4 2.6 100.0
1973 (pre-war) 70.7 16.0 9.6 3.7 100.0
1973 (war) 53.3 34.9 9.2 2.6 100.0
19751
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the three years remain significant: x 2 = 12.4823; d.f.
= 4; p < 0.5 (see Table III).
DiscussiON
While acknowledging that recorded crimes differ
in amount and nature from crimes actually commit-
ted, there still was a significant decrease in the
amount of crimes reported. The statistical analysis of
the daily crime average (actual and expected), the
calculation of rates, 6 the relation between the rise in
population and the evident decrease in criminality
during the war, and also the examination of differ-
ences using the x 2 test verify the first hypothesis. This
decrease in the amount of crime can be explained by
possible changes in the "opportunity structure" for
crime and in the criminal population; and also by
changes in the operations of law enforcement and the
system of social control.' Although trends cannot yet
be confirmed until information is available regarding
arrests or the results of the judicial processes for
those who committed crimes during the war, it seems
plausible that the amount of "hidden criminality" is
larger in wartime than in peacetime. This is due both
to the above-mentioned reasons, and to possible
changes in complaint patterns by the public.
It was found that the actual decrease in the
amount of crime in the early days of the war reversed
itself after the sixth day of the war. The preliminary
results of a victimization survey indicate that it is
unlikely that this increase is a result either of an
increased awareness on the part of the public or of
changes in police enforcement policies from the sixth
day of the war. 8 Furthermore, recidivists are not
enlisted in Israel. Thus, it would appear that the
increase in reported offences from the sixth day of
the war was caused by a transition by the criminal
sector from a period of organization to an adapta-
tion to the new conditions and opportunities for
criminality created by the war. ' Since there was an
'For the period of the War of the Day of Atonement
300,000 males were subtracted from the Israeli population.
Since the number of reserves is in fact kept secret, we used
the information given in NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1973, at 9,
which gives this general figure for the number of reserves
at the time of the war. From the general population those
under sixteen and over sixty-five years of age were
subtracted; also subtracted was the total population of Arab
women living within the 1948 borders of Israel.
"Taken from POLICE WEEKLY 242 (1973) (Israel Police
Organization Publication).
'The victimization survey was part of a daily public
opinion survey conducted for the government by the
Applied Social Science Institution and the Institute of
Communication of the'Hebrew University.
9H. VON HENTIG, CRIME: CAUSES AND CONDITIONS,
(1947).
TABLE III
EXAMINATION OF SIGNIFICANCE OF PAIRS OF YEARS
WITHOUT AUTO THEFT
1973 1971 1969
not sig. not sig. 1969 With
p < .05 not sig. 1971 auto
p < .001 p < .001 1973 theft
increase in those crimes which require specialization
or professional expertise (burglary and property
thefts), it may be suggested that the same criminals
who were in operation before the war, minus those
who were enlisted, renewed their activity, even
above their normal "quota," after the war began. It
seems that more crimes were committed, then, by
fewer criminals.
The second hypothesis is based on the assumption
that the changes in the opportunity structure caused
by the war will inevitably cause qualitative altera-
tions in the crime pattern.
The findings show a numerical decrease in crimes
against the person and miscellaneous crimes, but no
qualitative changes. The same sub-categories which
were prevalent during the control periods remained
so during the war. By analyzing crimes against
property it was found that during the war the
percentage of burglaries from private homes de-
creased by about one-third compared to the control
periods. These facts may be explained by the limita-
tions on civilian movement due to the war. The
evident increase during the war of burglaries from
commercial establishments and offices appears to be
directly connected with people staying home, the
decrease in frequency of street policing and control,
and perhaps with the ability of the criminals to
predict, after only a few days of war, the patterns of
police surveillance. A further qualitative difference is
found in changes in the choice of targets for the
burglaries and thefts, from supplies and materials,
which require large vehicles for transportation
(which were almost entirely absent from the home
front), to smaller items, which can be carried in
private vehicles or on foot.
A large increase was disclosed in the number of
reported car thefts. There is already some evidence
that at least some of the thefts of private vehicles were
committed by soldiers either in a hurry to reach their
units, or to get home because of a short leave from
duty. Support for this assumption is found in the fact
that a large part of the "joy-riding" population was
enlisted, and further the closing of most of the
garages prevented operations normally carried out by
car thieves and car strippers.
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"Business (Crime) as Usual"
It was noted that an atmosphere of volunteerism,
patriotism and solidarity swept over Israel during the
war. However, if we distinguish between the law-
abiding citizen and the criminal, distinct differences
are evident in their behavior. While most of the
population worked in order to make a contribution to
the nation, it appears that the criminal sector, and
new elements who joined it during the war, acted in a
contrary fashion. The findings of this study, although
tentative, support this conclusion. The increase in
crime beginning on the sixth day of the war reflects
renewed organization of criminal activity, and the
decrease in the reported crimes at the beginning of
the war suggests that the criminals who were not
enlisted "worked" even harder in their exploitation
of "differential organization." Furthermore, the
crime rates which were calculated for the entire
period of the war were especially influenced by the
rates for the first few days of the war, a time which
could be viewed as a period of adaptation and
exploration of the new opportunities for crime. The
third point in support of the conclusion that the
criminal sector acted according to the dictum "busi-
ness as usual," is revealed in the increase in
burglary. These are crimes which require the plan-
ning, organization, and skill of professionals who are
able to adapt quickly and exploit changing circum-
stances, including those brought about by the war.
For these people the blackout is not a defense against
bombs, but a cover to avoid detection. Further strong
evidence is provided by the testimony of the National
Chief of Police who notes that while the emergency
situation continues, the activities of the criminal
underworld gradually approach the level that existed
before the war.'"
CONCLUSIONS
Our two frameworks, crime and societal reactions,
called "differential organization" by Sutherland,
constitute a theoretical concept which connects war
'As reported on December 11, 1973, at a meeting
between public officials and police officers at Police Head-
quarters.
and crime, and explains the official picture of crime
and delinquency during the war. The disturbance of
the balance between elements of crime commission
and control, which together comprise the system of'
"differential organization," is responsible for the
differences in the official crime rates (but not in
amount). Of course, the description of the changes
which occur in the "differential organization," and
the rates which are thus affected, should also include:
(1) an explanation of their characteristics during the
various stages of the war; and, (2) criminogenic
variables which are suitable to the description and
analysis of crime and reactions to crime during
peacetime. In other words, it should identify and
analyze the changes which are observed in the offense
rates and patterns of crime which do not arise merely
due to the war but also as a result of factors which
operated before the war or factors which arose
independently, but coincidently, with the war.
The research on the history of the previouswars in
Israel has neglected the criminological aspect, while
the criminologists, like other social scientists, can in
fact exploit the opportunity offered by the war to
examine their theoretical explanations regarding
social factors and their relationship to the phenom-
ena of crime." The prolonged influences of war on
crime should be of interest and provide a source for
further studies. There should be an examination of
the difference between the number of crimes commit-
ted and the number and type of complaints to the
police, by means of a victim-survey, as part of the
crime commission patterns.
In the light of the changes which took place in the
activities of the police during the war and the
consequent small number of arrests, there is a need
for further research on the extent and type of changes
which occur in crime and in the composition of the
criminal population on both the arrest and conviction
level, in order to test the changes which take place in
the official reactions of the judicial administration.
"See D. R. CRESSEY, Some Obstacles to Generalizing
in Criminology, in DELINQUENCY, CRIME AND DIFFER-
ENTIAL AssOCIATION chs. II & III (1964); Sutherland,
supra note 1.
